Research and Predictions

Mayoral Prediction
Assembly Prediction
BNP's Prospects
Diversity and Representation
Thresholds for Assembly Election
Spoilt Ballots

A. Mayoral Scenarios under the SV system:

Given the closeness of the race between Ken and Boris and the fact that no candidate has won over 50% of first preferences in previous mayoral contests, it seems likely that second preferences will matter. In which case the following results could occur:

(i) Ken gets more first preferences and wins overall
This result is likely to be relatively uncontroversial. After all, Ken has won twice before this way; leading in first preference votes and increasing his winning margin after second preference votes have been counted.

(ii) Ken wins on second preferences, after being behind on first preferences
This result would show the value of attracting support from a wide base. It could raise the temperature regarding PR and AV in the Conservatives as it could be perceived that changing the election system was a means of preserving Labour hegemony.

(iii) Boris gets more first preferences and wins overall
As with (i) this result would be relatively uncontroversial, though it might make some in Labour further suspicious of the whole mayoral project. It would also signify a very good result for the Conservatives.

(iv) Boris wins on second preferences, after being behind on first preferences
This result would show the value of attracting support from a wide base. It might also signify the success of anti-Ken tactical voting. For projecting forward for a General Election, more work would need to be done to ascertain how representative Lib Dem transfers in London would be of the country as a whole. A Boris victory on second preferences could be perceived by opponents of electoral reform in the Labour party as yet more evidence for electoral reform being bad for Labour. They would seek to link the London result with that in Scotland and the near result in Wales, however erroneous this might be to those who understand electoral systems.

B. London Assembly Scenarios under the MMP system

GLA prediction
Click here to see the table.

• Of 13 who are completely certain to be GLA members, there are 7 Conservatives, 4 Labour and 2 Lib Dem.
• Of 6 more who are overwhelmingly likely, there are 2 Conservatives, 3 Labour and 1 Lib Dem.
• this leaves 6 seats uncertain, of whom one is very likely to be a Conservative (either Boff or Laban, depending on the constituency outcome in Enfield & Haringey, although a high Conservative share of the vote could elect both). Then we have 5 uncertain, drawn from among Boff and two Labour, two Green, two BNP and one Lib Dem.

Overall composition is therefore likely to be:

Con 9-11
Lab 7-9
LD 3-4
Green 0-2
BNP 0-2

Only if Livingstone wins, but Labour plus Green falls below 9, is there much of an implication for the governability of London.

C. The BNP's electoral prospects

As indicated above, it is possible that the BNP could gain one or maybe two seats on the London Assembly. If that happens, it would be an accurate reflection of the sheer number of votes the party had achieved. A valid question to ask is whether it the job of an electoral system to sweep uncomfortable opinions under the carpet or reflect how people voted?

In 2004, the BNP would have won a seat had it not been for the 5% threshold for the London-wide list. The BNP became the force it is in Barking & Dagenham because of the FPTP electoral system. In the 2006 local elections they gained 12 seats on Barking and Dagenham Council, but got less votes than the Conservatives and UKIP, who got one.

Ultimately if a party has a substantial vote it has won a right to a voice - not control, but a voice.

If the BNP don't win any seats, this may likely be the result of a massively increased turnout. The excitement whipped up by the tight Boris/Ken race may be one factor in that; but so may the fact that people were motivated to vote as they knew that wherever in London they lived they could help defeat the BNP.

D. Diversity and Representation

The GLA will probably not do badly at all for ethnic representation, and fairly respectably for gender as well - Cleverly, Arnold, Qureshi, maybe Shah, not counting Jewish members - Coleman and Gavron. While it's not the London proportion of the population, 29% i.e. about 7 out of 25 GLA members, it's better than Westminster! Moreover it is quite possibly that there could be 8 women out of 25.

E. Thresholds for London Elections

A party needs to cross the threshold of 5 per cent of the London-wide list vote in order to get list representation.

Click here to see the statistics

F. Spoilage

It is worth flagging up one issue for the mayoral election:

Conflation of second preferences
There is a very important difference between invalid ballots and non-transferred preferences. The latter are not 'spoilt'; and could be due to a variety of factors - ranging from voters not expressing a second choice; to expressing a second choice for a candidate who is not in the top two and thus the vote is not able to be transferred.

"Some voters will choose not to cast a second preference because they are indifferent between all the candidates other than their favoured one, and that is of course their right. However, the scale and pattern of wasted votes indicates that this is a relatively small element of the non-transfer of votes in the second round of mayoral elections. In London in 2004 14.2 per cent of valid first-preference votes were not valid for second preference, which seems a very high level of indifference if taken at face value. On top of these voters (who mostly left the second column blank) there was another widespread phenomenon that invalidated second votes: double voting.

'Double voting' (i.e. casting first- and second preferences for the same candidate) was measurable in the 2004 London mayor election. Overall in London, 7.7 per cent of valid first-preference votes had the same candidate as their second preference, something that could not possibly help that candidate. The incidence of double voting was related to social exclusion and not having English as a second language, as is apparent from the distribution between the borough-based GLA constituencies. Double voting was particularly prevalent among Respect and Labour voters. Particularly in the context of an election with as many ballot papers as in London in 2004 (mayoral, GLA constituency, GLA list and European), voters who are not particularly aware of the different systems may decide to vote for the party they support at every opportunity. The second column of the mayoral ballot may seem an extension of that principle.

There are also a large proportion of ballots where people have filled the paper out completely correctly but just chosen two candidates who did not make it to the second round. In order to cast an effective second preference, voters need to guess which of the candidates will be in the final round, and which out of those two they would prefer. Elimination of all but the top two candidates has created an arbitrary element in the choice of elected mayors and reduced the influence that voters' choice has been having on the final results."

[ERS: Britain's Experience of Electoral Systems, p106-107]